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I. INTRODUCTION
New attention on Cuba and speculation about its evolution
were prompted last year by reports of Havana's intent to release
fifty-two political prisoners,' the actual release of a select number
of prisoners of conscience, 2 the announced layoff of 500,000
Cubans from the government payroll,3 and Fidel Castro's visible
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Security Council (2005-2009) and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Western
Hemisphere Affairs (2002-2005), as well as service on the staffs of the U.S. Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations and the House of Representatives Committee on
Foreign Affairs. He holds J.D. and master degrees from Georgetown University and a
bachelor of science from the University of Tulsa. He is a member of the Maryland
State Bar Association and the Council on Foreign Relations.
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1. Juan 0. Tamayo, Church: Castro to Free Prisoners, MLIv HERALD, July 8,
2010, http://www.miamiherald.com/2010/07/07/1720412/church-castro-to-free-
prisoners.html.
2. Juan 0. Tamayo, Seven Cuban Political Prisoners Freed; Flown to Madrid,
MIAMI HERALD, July 12, 2010, http://www.miamiherald.com/2010/07/12/1727475/
seven-cuban-political-prisoners.html; Fabiola Santiago, 11 Cuban Prisoners;
Expatriated to Spain, are Wairy, Ailing, Defiant, and Free, MLtmi HERALD, July 17,
2010, http://www.miamiherald.com/2010/07/17/1735709/11-cuban-prisoners-
expatriated.html.
3. Juan 0. Tamayo, Cuban Jobs Going Private in Overhaul, MIAMI HERALD, Sept.
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re-emergence and reported admission that "the Cuban model
doesn't even work for us anymore."4 What these events portend for
Cuba's future remains open to question; yet, that they reflect a
sclerotic regime's effort to manage the continuing pressures upon
it seems certain.
In the nearly two decades since the end of the Soviet Union
and its financial underwriting of Fidel Castro's adventurism and
totalitarian model, Havana has struggled to engineer its survival
through selective engagement strategies, balancing Cuba's inabil-
ity to remain immune from globalization while restraining the
interaction of Cuban citizens with the broader world through
restrictions on travel and access to communications and informa-
tion. To date, several tactical moves have delayed "Castro's final
hour:"' limited reforms in the economic sphere and symbolic ges-
tures of human rights, overlaid with a pervasive apparatus for
repression. However, the Cuban government's need to generate
revenues, including through its participation in global capital
markets, has not been alleviated. Since Fidel Castro, due to ill-
ness, initially passed temporary power to his brother Radil Castro
beginning in August 2006, the internal and external pressures on
the country have only increased. These pressures are due partly to
the regime's inability to reconcile its objective of maintaining the
political and economic power of the ruling elite with the conse-
quences of opening up sectors of the economy; partly to the global
economic downturn; and partly to a consistent U.S. policy that has
denied the Cuban government the ability to generate significant
revenues in areas like mass tourism, which Havana has seen as a
way to finance its perpetuation in power.'
13, 2010, http:/www.miamiherald.con/2010/09/13/1823521/cuban-jobs-going-private-
in-overhaul.html.
4. Jeffrey Goldberg, Fidel: Cuban Model Doesn't Even Work for Us Anymore,
ATLANTIC (Sept. 8, 2010, 12:00 PM), available at http://www.theatlantic.com/
international/archive/2010/09/fidel-cuban-model-doesnt-even-work-for-us-anymore/
62602/.
5. ANDRES OPPENHEIMER, CASTRO'S FINAL HOUR: THE SECRET STORY BEHIND THE
COMING DOWNFALL OF COMMUNIST CUBA (Touchstone 1992).
6. Larry Luxner, Cuba Seeks End to American Travel Ban, Readies for an
Onslaught of U.S. Tourists, LUXNER NEWS INC. (Oct. 2010), http://www.luxner.com/
cgi-bin/view..article.cgi?articlelD=1925 (discussing the importance of tourism to the
Cuban government); Denuncian Perdidas por Restricciones a Viajes desde EEUU, EL
NUEVO HERALD, Oct. 16, 2010, http://www.elnuevoherald.com/2010/10/16/820904/
denuncian-perdidas-por-restricciones.html#storylink=omni-popular. See BUREAU OF
W. HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COMM'N FOR ASSISTANCE TO A FREE
CUBA: REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, ch. 1 (2004), available at http://2005-2009.cafc.gov/
rpt/index.htm (hereinafter "CAFC REPORT"). The Cuban tourism sector is dominated
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Early in 2008, citizen expectations for reforms that would
lead to improved living conditions abounded when Fidel Castro
formally resigned and ceded authority as President of Cuba to
Rafil Castro.7 Within days of that leadership succession, the antic-
ipation of significant change was further fed when the Cuban gov-
ernment signed two United Nations (UN) human rights covenants
- the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights -
released some political prisoners,' made early public statements
and initiated a series of dialogues throughout the nation on the
state of the Cuban economy.9
In the period since, rather than genuinely moving toward har-
monization with international human rights practices, the Cuban
government under Radl Castro's titular leadership has remained
focused on maintaining power. The Cuban government has
encouraged its citizens to tighten their belts, while it announced a
reduction in the bloated government pay-roll in conjunction with
expanded categories of self-employment. These so-called "reforms"
also come with a new tax structure by which the government will
profit from the self-employed. 10
Internal inefficiencies, the lingering effects of three hurri-
canes in 2008, and the decrease in earnings from key exports,
tourism, and services as a result of the global economic downturn
have left Cuban citizens facing their deepest hardships since the
by the Cuban military, making tourism even more critical to the Cuban government's
survival strategy. See also Marc Frank, Military Man to Head Cuba's Biggest
Company, REUTERS (Sept. 27, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE68Q54
H20100927?pageNumber=1.
7. James C. McKinley Jr., Raidl Castro Becomes Cuban President, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 4, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/24/world/americas/24iht-cuba.5.1034
2397.html.
8. Cuba Signs Human Rights Pledges, BBC NEWS (Feb. 28, 2008, 10:44 PM),
http://news.bbc.co.ukl2/hi/americas/7270179.stm.
9. Under Radl Castro's tenure, economic changes have occurred in two primary
ways: 1.) removing what are deemed to be excessive prohibitions and 2.) changes in
selected economic sectors such as agriculture and through small pilot project
initiatives. See Marc Frank, Chronology - Raul Castro's Road to Reform in Cuba,
REUTERS (Sept. 20, 2010), http://www.foxbusiness.com/markets/2010/09/20/
chronology-raul-castros-road-reform-cuba/ (providing a chronology of Raul Castro's
reform-oriented speeches since 2007).
10. For discussions on Cuba's recent economic announcements, see Jose Azel, Is
Cuba Moving Towards Capitalism?, CUBA TRANSITION PROJECT, INST. FOR CU1AN AND
CuBAN-AM. STUDIES, UNIV. OF MIAMI 132 (Sept. 27, 2010); Mario A. Gonzalez-Corzo,
The Reduction of State-Sector Workers in Cuba, CUBA TRANSITION PROJECT, INST. FOR
CUBAN AND CUBAN-AM. STUDIES, UNIV. OF MIAMI 133 (Oct. 12, 2010). See also Jose
Azel, So Much for Cuban Economic Reform, WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 2011, http://
online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203418804576039640218425926.html.
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difficulties experienced during the "special period" in the immedi-
ate wake of the end of Soviet subsidies." At the same time, politi-
cal repression remains pervasive and commonplace as the
government continues to utilize oppressive tactics against those
individuals seeking to exercise fundamental freedoms.12
Tensions increased on the island in the weeks following the
death of Orlando Zapata Tamayo, an Amnesty International pris-
oner of conscience who died on February 23, 2010, following an
eighty-six day hunger strike for better prison conditions.13 The
Cuban government initiated a campaign to deny the Damas de
Blanco (Ladies in White) the ability to hold silent marches of pro-
test for their loved ones. 4 In fact, the Cuban government
increased pressure on virtually all of its citizens allegedly for the
purpose of defending the country against what it called an "enemy
campaign" condemning human-rights abuses on the island. 5
These increased tensions in the early months of 2010 not only
raised the calls of world leaders for the Cuban government to
respect human rights, but it also prompted new groups within
Cuba to come to the front of the discussion and help mediate solu-
tions. Namely, the Catholic Church, recognizing that change was
needed and needed soon, began a dialogue with the Cuban govern-
ment. In an interview published in Palabra Nueva, the magazine
of the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Havana, Cardinal Jaime
Ortega first gave voice to the difficult social and economic situa-
tion that Cuba faces and the need to find immediate solutions:
11. For an overview of the "special period," see JAIME SucicmICI, CUBA: FROM
COLUMBUS TO CASTRO AND BEYOND ch. 15 (Potomac Books, 5th ed. 2002).
12. See 2009 Human Rights Report: Cuba, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN
RIGHTS, AND LABOR (Mar. 11, 2010), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/wha/
136108.htm. See also Juan 0. Tamayo, Cuban Security Agents Again Halt March by
Ladies in White, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 18, 2010, http://www.miamiherald.com/2010/
04/18/1586107/agents-again-halt-march-by-the.html#ixzz0tCfN9eim (discussing the
increased repression on all sectors of society).
13. See Death of Cuban Prisoner of Conscience on Hunger Strike Must Herald
Change, AMNESTY INT'L. (Feb. 24, 2010), http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-
updates/death-cuban-prisoner-conscience-hunger-strike-must-herald-change-2010-
02-24.
14. See Tamayo, supra note 12. The Ladies in White are comprised of the relatives
and supporters of individuals arrested and imprisoned in March 2003 during the
government's crackdown on Cuban dissidents and pro-democracy activists, known as
the "Black Spring." During that period, approximately seventy-five independent
journalists, librarians, and democracy and human rights advocates were ultimately
convicted with sentences ranging from six to twenty-eight years. See generally LADIES
IN WHITE, http://www.damasdeblanco.com/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2010); Ladies in
White, YouTuBE (Aug. 27, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4vWNAHLOzVk.
15. See Tamayo, supra note 12.
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Our country is in a very difficult situation, surely the most
difficult we have lived through in the 21st Century ....
There is a basic common denominator among almost all
opinion givers: the changes needed to remedy this situation
should be made in Cuba soon. I believe this opinion has
reached a kind of national consensus and its delay produces
impatience and malaise among the people. 6
Recognizing that impatience and malaise with the economic
and social conditions was precisely what was forming amongst
Cuban citizens, Cardinal Ortega and the Catholic Church worked
as mediators between independent civic actors and the Cuban gov-
ernment. The Catholic Church, however, was not the only group to
call on the Cuban government to improve its human rights prac-
tices. The Cuban government faced an unprecedented level of
international scrutiny and pressure. Amnesty International
among other international organizations, leaders, and govern-
ments across the globe actively pressured the Cuban government
to end the repression.17 With the international and domestic pres-
sures on the Cuban government mounting, the Cuban government
made initial concessions to improve the living conditions of politi-
cal prisoners, such as moving them closer to home and releasing
some of those with the most troubling health conditions. 8 This
was followed by an announcement that it would release fifty-two
of the seventy-five individuals arrested in the "Black Spring" 2003
government crackdown on civic activists. 9 Shortly thereafter,
declaring victory, civic activist Guillermo Farinas ended his hun-
ger strike of more than four months, with the stipulation that he
would resume if the Cuban government did not keep its promise to
release the prisoners. 20
Economically, Cuba's woes have continued to worsen with the
16. Orlando Marquez, Entrevista con el Cardenal Jaime Ortega, Arzobispo de La
Habana [Our Voice is a Call to Dialogue: Interview with Cardinal Jaime Ortega,
Archbishop of Havana], PALABRA NUEVA (Apr. 2010), http://www.palabranueva.net/
contens/noticias2010/pn-O 1.pdf.
17. See Dissident Group Allowed to March in Cuba, LATIN AMERICAN HERALD
TRIBUNE, http://www.laht.com/article.asp?Articleld=356354&CategoryId=14510 (last
visited Oct. 21, 2010).
18. See Fabiola Santiago, The Hardest Life: Surviving Cuban Jail, MIAMI HERALD,
July 30, 2010, http://www.miamiherald.com/2010/07/30/1754665/the-hardest-life-
surviving-cuban.html; Santiago, supra note 2; Tamayo, supra note 2.
19. See Jeff Franks, Cuba Takes First Steps Toward Prisoner Release, REUTERS
(July 8, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE66760320100709.
20. See Jeff Franks et al., Factbox: Dissident Guillermo Farinas Ends Hunger
Strike, REUTERS (July 8, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE66758M20
100708.
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Cuban government reporting decreases in foreign investment and
agricultural production, as well as confronting a reduction in
imports that could compensate for production inefficiencies and
provide food for the country. Faced with this dire economic situa-
tion, the government announced economic restructuring ranging
from announcements that 500,000 state workers will be dismissed
by March 2011, to the potential issuance of 250,000 new private
sector licenses, a new foreign investment law that will allow
investors ninety-nine year property leases, and the firing of the
minister for basic industry for "shortcomings" - all changes remi-
niscent of those taken in the mid-1990s under similar economic
pressures. 21 Amidst this flurry of social, political, and economic
developments, Fidel Castro made his first of a series of public
appearances since falling ill over four years ago.22
While internal and external pressure, including continuing
discussions of policy changes by the European Union and the
United States, has led the Cuban government to take steps to
improve its image, such as the release of political prisoners held
since the crackdown of 2003,23 repression and attempts by the gov-
ernment to close any space for independent expression and civic
activity by Cuban citizens remain prevalent.24 Meanwhile, on a
day-to-day level, Cuban citizens struggle with limited economic
opportunities, a shortage of housing, a failing health care system,
and increasing food scarcity, with continued official promises of
reforms that have yet to materialize.
Confronted with these hard realities, the question remains
whether the Cuban government will make concrete social, politi-
21. The Cuban government announced the layoff of 500,000 workers in 1995,
which the U.S. and other media trumpeted as a sign of significant change in Cuba.
See Joblessness: Cuba's Newest Crisis State Firing Workers in Risky Attempt to Halt
Economic Free Fall, MIAi HERALD, May 2, 1995, at 1A ("President Fidel Castro's
government has declared it expects to lay off up to 500,000 workers - as many as one
in seven - in addition to the twenty percent who have already lost their jobs. It is an
unavoidable step in the government's blueprint for economic survival . . . ."); see also
Cuba to Allow Small Restaurants, WASH. POST, June 15, 1995, at A33 (reporting that
Cuba announced it will allow small family-run restaurants).
22. See Marc Frank, Cuba Announces Mass Layoffs in Bid to Spur Private Sector,
REuTERS (Sept. 14, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/articleidUSTRE68DOFG20100914;
see also Juan Tamayo, Cuba's Rail Castro Fires Powerful Cabinet Minister, MLmi
HERALD, Sept. 20, 2010, http://www.miamiherald.com/2010/09/20/1833709/cuba-fires-
minister-for-oil-mining.html; Juan Tamayo, Cuba Extends Lease Limits for Foreign
Investors, MIAi HERALD, Sept. 1, 2010, http://www.miamiherald.com/2010/08/31/
1799824/cuba-extends-lease-limits-for.html#ixzzllmeuGGuW.
23. Santiago, supra note 2; Tamayo, supra note 2.
24. See 2009 Human Rights Report: Cuba, supra note 12.
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cal, and economic structural adjustments that respect the funda-
mental rights of the Cuban people, including making decisions on
who governs them and how they will be governed, and allow for a
society where citizens can freely meet their needs. Or is this sim-
ply another moment, as has been seen before during the past two
decades, when the Cuban government makes tactical adjust-
ments, including continuing a strategy of managed engagement
with external actors, to preserve the current closed, centralized
power arrangement?
To provide some context for the larger discussion on Cuba,
part one of this article presents general background on the con-
temporary socio-political environment in Cuba. Part two describes
Cuba's effort to benefit from foreign investment while managing
the impact of that engagement. Part three then provides an over-
view of U.S. policy towards Cuba.
II. THE CURRENT CUBAN SOCIO-POLITICAL CONTEXT
"[I]n Castro's Cuba, it is necessary to distinguish
between the stubborn reality and the idyllic facts presented
by the authorities."
A. The Realities of Life in Cuba
During the struggle in the 1950s against the government of
strongman Fulgencio Batista, Fidel Castro's 26th of July Move-
ment gained popular support both because of its militancy
towards Batista and its promise to restore civil liberties and politi-
cal democracy. Upon success in forcing Batista into exile, instead
of a rebirth of political pluralism and freedom, Castro and his
allies imposed a totalitarian model on Cuba - with the political
fundamentals of that model remaining in place to this day.
Under the Castro brothers, the Cuban state allows no politi-
cal choice, the judiciary dispatches cases based on political crite-
ria, and the 614 member national assembly has never voted in
opposition to a proposal presented by the country's leader.25 The
state controls the media and a single party controls the state.26 A
centralized authority controls significant economic policy deci-
sions and labor relationships. The state restricts speech, assem-
bly, association, and worship, and it uses mass surveillance and
intrusion of privacy, including the pervasive monitoring of private
25. Id.
26. Id.
20101
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communications, to control the population.27
Further, there is no notion of the "rule of law" under which
the law is neutral in its application. Rather, Cuban law is an
instrument of social control meant to reinforce the power of the
state, not protect the rights of individuals. There are laws, but
there is no constraint upon the application of those laws, and the
legal code itself is Orwellian. As former Justice Department offi-
cial and constitutional scholar Bruce Fein summed it up:
[I]t is almost oxymoronic to speak of rule of law [in Cuba]
because, as I said, the earmark of the regime is lawless-
ness. That is how we recognize them being totalitarian.
That is, there is no principled restraint upon what those in
authority may do at anytime, anyplace, anywhere. It is all
by whimsy and arbitrary decree of one or a few.28
To illustrate Fein's point and Cuba's Orwellian use of "law" as
a means of state control, the following are examples from the
Cuban Penal Code:29
" "Dangerousness" (peligrosidad): defined generally as occur-
ring when a person acts in a manner contradictory to
"socialist morality" or engages in "anti-social behavior."
The penalty for "dangerousness" is up to four years
imprisonment. °
" "Disrespect" (descacato): occurs when a person has been
determined to threaten, slander, defame, insult, or in any-
way, offend the dignity of a public official. Under this provi-
sion, a person can be imprisoned from three months to a
year or fined, or both. However, if one is found to have "dis-
respected" the head of state or other senior officials, the
penalty is one to three years imprisonment.3
27. Id.
28. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act: Hearing on S. 381 Before the S.
Comm. on Western Hemisphere and Peace Corps Affairs, 104th Cong. 152 (1995)
(statement of Bruce Fein, former Associate Deputy Attorney General of the United
States), available at 1995 WL 360389.
29. CODIGO PENAL [COD. PEN.] Ley 62 (Cuba), available at http://www.ruleof
lawandcuba.fsu.edu/law-penal-code.cfm. Summaries of the Cuban Penal Code articles
are also taken from Amnesty Int'l, Cuba: Dissidents Imprisoned or Forced into Exile,
AI Index AMR 25/29/96 (July 1, 1996); Amnesty Int'l, Cuba: Government Crackdown
on Dissent, AI Index AMR 25/14/96 (Apr. 1996). DOUGLAS PAYNE, IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION SERVICE, CUBA: SYsTEMATic REPRESSION OF DISSENT (Dec. 1998),
available at http://www.worldpolicy.org/globalrights/carib/1997-cuba.html.
30. COD. PEN. Ley 62 arts. 72-90 (Cuba). These terms - "socialist morality" or
"anti-social behavior" - have no precise definition or standards; the Cuban authorities
determine when behavior reaches a point of "dangerousness."
31. Id. at art. 144.
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* "Enemy propaganda" (propaganda enemiga): creates and
defines the crime of "enemy propaganda" as existing when
a person incites, by any means, against the social order,
international solidarity or the socialist Cuban state.12 This
crime further covers the conveyance of what the authorities
determine to be false or malicious information, which could
cause alarm among the citizenry or public disorder.33 Viola-
tors can be imprisoned from one to eight years, with penal-
ties increasing up to fifteen years if an act in this area
involves the mass media.3"
" "Dissemination of false information against international
peace" (difusi6n de falsas informaciones contra la paz inter-
nacional): this crime is determined to occur when a person
spreads anything deemed by Cuban authorities to disturb
international peace or place in danger Cuba's prestige or
the Cuban State's "good relations" with another state.3
The punishment is from one to four years imprisonment. 6
* "Conspiracy" (also known as "associating with others to
commit a crime"/asociaci6n para delinquir): potentially
exists when three or more persons meet together and are
then determined to engage in some behavior deemed ille-
gal, such as meeting in a context determined to constitute
"dangerousness" or "disrespect. 37 Penalties under this pro-
vision range from one to three years imprisonment.
* "Illicit association" (asociaci6n ilicita): applies to anyone
belonging to an unregistered group or association, includ-
ing meetings or demonstrations deemed by Cuban authori-
ties to be illegal.39 Participation in an "illicit association" is
punishable by a fine or from one to three months imprison-
ment; promoters, leaders, or organizers of an illicit associa-
tion can be fined or jailed from three months to a year.40
According to the State Department, in 2009, as many as 5,000
Cubans were detained for "dangerousness," meaning that these
32. C6digo Penal [COD. PEN.] Ley 62 art. 103 (Cuba).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. C6digo Penal [COD. PEN.] Ley 62 art. 115 (Cuba).
36. Id.
37. C6digo Penal [COD. PEN.] Ley 62 art. 207 (Cuba).
38. Id.
39. C6digo Penal [C6D. PEN.] Ley 62 arts. 208-209 (Cuba).
40. Id.
20101
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individuals were not charged with any specific crime.41 This num-
ber is in addition to those individuals deemed prisoners of con-
science, the numbers of which range from 50 to 200.42 The
systematic harassment of Cuban citizens, including short-term
detentions, continued to take place throughout 2010.4"
For those incarcerated in Cuba, beatings and the abuse of
detainees and prisoners, including human rights activists, are
practiced with impunity; Castro's prisons include life-threatening
conditions, and the denial of medical care is common.44 Govern-
ment-recruited mobs, police, and state security officials harass,
beat, and threaten independent political and civil activists, while
human rights advocates and members of independent professional
organizations are subject to arbitrary arrest and detention.45
Restrictions on freedom of movement include selective denial of
exit permits to citizens and the forcible removal of persons from
Havana to their hometowns.46 Consistent with its treatment of its
citizens, the government refuses to recognize domestic human
rights groups or permit them to function legally.
Living under a repressive system has become normal for a
large majority of Cubans. More than seventy-three percent of
Cuba's population has been born since 1959. 4' As a result, "[N]o
Cuban under the age of fifty has lived with a free press, free labor
unions, or an independent judicial system or legislature; nor has
he participated in pluralistic elections or in any way been exposed
41. See 2009 Human Rights Report: Cuba, supra note 12.
42. Id.
43. For a typical example, see Urgent Action: Pro-Democracy Activists Arbitrarily
Detained, AMNESTY INTL (Aug. 25, 2010), http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/
AMR25/013/2010/en/932cb071-5166-4c7b-bc8O-12c6b2f023bc/amr250132010en.pdf;
see also Urgent Action: Pro-Democracy Activists Released, AMNESTY INT'L (Sept. 8,
2010), http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AMR25/014/2010/en/72bblf2a-9934-
4103-a294-de6debaab940/amr250142010en.pdf (regarding the temporary detention
by Cuban authorities of five activists who were told they were to be charged with
public disorder). According to Amnesty, their detention "seems to be an attempt to
intimidate them and prevent them from peacefully exercising their right to freedom of
expression, assembly and association."
44. See 2009 Human Rights Report: Cuba, supra note 12.
45. See id. See also, Yoani Sanchez, "Ladies in White" Attacked by Government
Sanctioned Mob, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 18, 2010, 4:32 PM), httpJ/www.huffington
post.com/yoani-sanchezz/ladies-in-white-attacked-b-504817.html (describing an
attack by a Cuban government sanctioned mob on the Ladies in White as they
peacefully marched to mark the seventh anniversary of the 2003 "Black Spring"
arrests of civil society activists).
46. See 2009 Human Rights Report: Cuba, supra note 12.
47. Jose AZEL, MANANA IN CUBA: THE LEGACY OF CASTROISM AND TRANSITIONAL
CHALLENGES FOR CUBA 3 (Author House 2010).
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to the rights, privileges, and obligations of citizens in a pluralistic
democratic system.""
Contrasting with its effective system of repression, the Cuban
state has not been effective at the delivery of services.49 A conse-
quence has been lip service to "socialist values" contrasted by an
every-person-for-himself reality. This is known on the island as
doble moral, dual morality, where one face is for public consump-
tion while another face reflects private realities.'0 It is a culture in
which "[b]ypassing legal norms to overcome the impersonal
bureaucracies of ineffective government institutions immerses
individuals into a culture of practicing illegality as a means of
surviving. "51
B. Recent Events
In early 2010, the world began to take note of new voices in
the wake of the death of Orlando Zapata Tamayo, an Amnesty
International prisoner of conscience, who died following an 86-day
hunger strike for better prison conditions.5 2 "On the eve of the sec-
ond anniversary of Radl Castro coming to power, Orlando Zapata
Tamayo has died. We decree national mourning" tweeted Cuban
blogger Yoani Sanchez from Havana on February 23, 2010."3 Pres-
ident Ra-6l Castro, in a rare response to the situation, said that he
"regretted" Zapata's death.5" This overt acknowledgement on the
part of the Cuban government was unprecedented. This single
event occurred at a time when Cuba was already seeing a wave of
increased civic engagement and the emergence of new critics
within the government structure." These events acted as a cata-
48. Id.
49. See KATHERINE HIRSCHFELD, HEALTH POLITICS, AND REVOLUTION IN CUBA
SINCE 1898 (Transaction Publishers 2007).
50. AZEL, supra note 47, at 70.
51. AZEL, supra note 47, at 69.
52. See Cuba Signs Human Rights Pledges, supra note 8. Zapata was arrested in
2003 during a crackdown by Cuban authorities against independent civil society. He
was charged with an array of offences including resistance, contempt, and disrespect.
53. See Yoani Sanchez, Hunger Striking Amnesty International Prisoner of
Conscience Orlando Zapata Tamayo Dies Today in Cuba, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb.
23, 2010, 8:37 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/yoani-sanchez/hunger-striking-
amnesty-ib_-474170.html (providing Tweets from Yoani Sanchez).
54. See generally Castro 'Laments' Death of Hunger-Striking Dissident, BBC
NEWS, http:/lnews.bbc.co.uk/2/hi8535390.stm (last updated Feb. 24, 2010, 11:06 PM).
The statement by the Cuban government was originally released to international
media and placed on the Granma website; however, it was subsequently taken down.
55. Esteban Morales, an academic and high-ranking official in the Communist
Party of Cuba, was separated from the ranks of the party in mid-2010 after he wrote
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lyst for significant developments throughout 2010.56
Although not unprecedented, the current level of independent
civic activism is the most noteworthy since the 2002-early 2003
period. 7 It is different from those earlier activist efforts because of
its attempt to effect change by holding the Cuban government
accountable for its actions. In part, this new dynamic within inde-
pendent civil society can be attributed to increased access to infor-
mation technology and the opportunity these tools allow for
interaction with peers across the world. Larger numbers of
Cubans are now communicating with the outside world and
spreading information, including within Cuba, on what is taking
place on the island s.5  Despite facing retribution for their honesty,
Cuba's bloggers have emerged in the past couple of years as one of
the most prominent critical voices in the country. With an
increased day-to-day awareness on the part of the international
community and Cuban citizens of what is taking place across the
island, more individuals, organizations, and nations can put pres-
sure on the Cuban government to improve its human rights
practices .
an article critiquing Cuba's internal situation and calling corruption the true anti-
revolutionary. See Esteban Morales, Corruption: The True Counter-Revolution?,
PROGRESO WEEKLY (Apr. 21, 2010, 1:10 PM), http://progresoweekly.com2/index.php?
option=comcontent&view=article&id=1589:corruption-the-true-counter-revolution&
catid=36:in-cuba&Itemid=54; see also Pedro Campos, Esteban Morales Booted from
Cuba's Communist Party, HAVANA TIMES (June 28, 2010), http://www.havanatimes.
org/?p=25669 (discussing Morales' fall from favor for expressing his views and
denouncing what he considers the counter-revolutionary corruption and bureaucracy
that exists in the country).
56. See Cuban Dissident Orlando Zapata Tamayo's Death Draws Attention To
Cuba, LATIN AMERICA NEWS DISPATCH (Feb. 25, 2010), http://latindispatch.comI2010/
02/25/cuban-dissident-orlando-zapata-tamayos-death-draws-attention-to-cuba/.
57. In 2002, citing Articles 63 and 88 of Cuba's Constitution, Osvaldo Payd
Sardifias organized the Varela Project, bringing together a group of Cuban citizens
representing more than 140 independent organizations across Cuba. They presented
a petition with over 11,000 signatures to the Cuban National Assembly. The petition
requested a constitutional referendum to introduce substantive changes to preserve
the general welfare of Cuban citizens and respect human rights. The Cuban
government reaction was a massive crackdown on peaceful civic activities, including
the arrest and arbitrary detention of human rights activists in early 2003. See Annual
Report on Cuba, INTER-AMERICAN COMM'N ON HuMAN RIGHTS, http://www.cidh.oas.
org/annualrep/2003englchap.4a.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2010).
58. See Claudia Cadelo, This Street Belongs to the Ladies in White, OCTAVO CERCO
(Mar. 21, 2010), http://octavocercoen.blogspot.com/2010/03/this-street-belongs-to-
ladies-in-white.html; see also Yoani Sanchez, GENRACION Y, http://www.desdecuba.
comlgenerationy/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2010).
59. Communication and exchange with and between Cuban citizens continues to
expand with the increased use of information and communication technologies.
Additionally, independent issue-based organizations in Cuba are contributing to this
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Whether reporting in real-time on the events taking place on
the island, writing a retrospective blog post on their activities, or
spreading information and news received from abroad, Cuban citi-
zens with higher levels of technical skills and external contacts
are working collaboratively with other members of Cuba's inde-
pendent civil society.60 This collaboration was apparent in 2010
when independent actors across the island, from bloggers to issue-
based civil society groups, joined the voices of the Ladies in White
and independent journalist Guillermo Farinas 1 in their calls for
better living conditions for prisoners.62
This pressure from on and off the island ensured that some
form of action on the part of the Cuban government would be nec-
essary for continued stability and positive external relations.63
exchange of ideas and information in larger numbers through their use of new
technologies. For a portal to Cuban blogs see PORTAL DESDE CUBA, http://www.
desdecuba.com/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2010); see also CONSEJO DE RELATORES DE
DERECHOS HuMANOS DE CUBA, http://www.crdhcamanecerderechoshumanoscuba.org/
(last visited Oct. 28, 2010); POSRACIALIDAD - COMITI CIUDADANOS PO LA INTEGRACION
RACIAL, http://www.cir-integracion-racial-cuba.org/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2010)
(documenting two issue-based independent organizations in Cuba).
60. Increasingly, not only technically savvy bloggers, but also various members of
independent society from economists to journalists are joining together to share
experiences, exchange skill sets, and conduct trainings. See Claudia Cadelo, End of
the Course, OCTAVO CERCO (Apr. 10, 2010), http://octavocercoen.blogspot.com2010/04/
end-of-course.html.
61. Guillermo Farinas is a Cuban psychologist and independent journalist. He
stopped eating or taking any liquids the day following the death of Orlando Zapata
Tamayo, calling for better prison conditions and the release of the prisoners those
with the greatest ailments. See Nelson Acosta, Cuban Hunger Striker Says Ready to
Die if Necessary, REUTERS (Mar. 5, 2010, 4:18 PM), http://www.reuters.comlarticle/
idUSTRE6244DJ20100305; see also Alberto Nunez Betancourt, Cuba no Acepta
Presiones ni Chantajes, DIARIo GRANMA (Mar. 8, 2010), http://www.granma.cubaweb.
cuI2OlO/03/08/nacional/articO2.html (discussing where the Cuban government first
acknowledges Farinas and then condemns foreign press coverage of his hunger strike,
upholding that the government will not accept pressure or blackmail).
62. See Cadelo, supra note 58; Brave Ladies in Castro's Cuba, WALL ST. J., Apr.
27, 2010, http://online.wsj.conarticle/SB1000142405274870346520457520834352238
8902.html (discussing the Ladies in Support, a group of women who physically join
the Ladies in White in their marches).
63. See Dissident Group Allowed to March in Cuba, LATIN AMERICAN HERALD
TRIBUNE (http://www.laht.com/article.asp?ArticleId=356354&CategoryId=14510 (last
visited Oct. 21, 2010); see Insulza Pide al Gobierno Cubano la Excarcelaci6n de los
Presos Politicos Enfermos, GOOGLE (Mar. 30, 2010), http://www.google.com/hosted
news/epa/articleALeqM5jpTEIoZE-WODDH-rfQg-jFjXR08w; Presidente Chileno Dice
que Abogard por Recuperar la Democracia en la Isla, CUBAENCUENTRO (Mar. 23,
2010), http://www.cubaencuentro.com/es/internacional/noticias/presidente-chileno-
dice-que-abogara-por-recuperar-la-democracia-en-la-isla-232023; Mexico Worried
About Health of Cuban Hunger Striker, LATIN AMERICAN HERALD TRIBUNE, http://
www.laht.com/article.asp?Articleld=353829&Categoryld=14510 (last visited Oct. 21,
2010); European Parliament Resolution of 11 March 2010 on Prisoners of Conscience
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Hence, the government began to take small steps to improve the
living conditions of political prisoners, such as moving them closer
to home and releasing some of those with the most troubling
health conditions.' Since the announcement of the Cuban govern-
ment's intent to release fifty-two prisoners, forty have been
released on the condition that they go into exile in Spain." One
member of the group of fifty-two prisoners, Arnaldo Ramos
Lauzurique, was released in Cuba in November 2010 on humani-
tarian grounds and, as of mid-January 2011, the remaining eleven
from the group have refused to leave Cuba and therefore remain
in prison.66 While this development relieved some of the increased
pressure on the island, it has thus far fallen short of being trans-
formative of human rights practices on the island. For instance, in
August, a group of students who stood on the steps of the Univer-
sity of Havana, in peaceful solidarity with other young human-
rights activists in the eastern city of Baracoa, were themselves
arrested for this peaceful civic activity." Eduardo P6rez Flores,
one of the youths arrested, wrote in a letter to his mother from
prison: "[tell the world that in Cuba they are releasing political
prisoners on the one hand and incarcerating more on the other."68
Just days later on those same steps, Fidel Castro gave his first
speech before the Cuban public since falling ill in 2006 detailing
not plans on how to address the economic situation in the country,
or any of the numerous issues that plague Cuba, but rather speak-
ing about an impending threat of nuclear war in the Middle
in Cuba, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (Mar. 11, 2010), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2010-0063+0OC+XML+VO//EN&
language=en; Ban Ki-moon Lamenta la Muerte del Preso Politico Cubano Orlando
Zapata, EL NuEvo HERALD (Mar. 23, 2010), http://www.elnuevoherald.comI2010/03/
23/680418/ban-ki-moon-lamenta-la-muerte.html#ixzz0kLwlHeKV; Statement by the
President on the Human Rights Situation in Cuba (Mar. 24, 2010), http://www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/statement-president-human-rights-situation-cuba.
64. See Franks, supra note 19.
65. See Cardinal Expects More Dissidents to Be Released in Cuba, LATIN AMERICAN
HERALD TRIBUNE (Jan. 2, 2011), http://www.laht.com/article.asp?ArticleId=382851&
CategoryId=14510.
66. Id.
67. See Alberto de la Cruz, Cuban Democracy Activists Arrested in Havana,
BABALU BLOG (Aug. 17, 2010, 9:01 AM) http://babalublog.com/2010/08/cuban-
democracy-activists-arrested-in-havana/; see also Pro-Democracy Leaders Arrested at
the University of Havana, CAPITOL HILL CUBANs (Aug. 16, 2010, 11:37 PM), http:/l
www.capitolhillcubans.com/2010/08/pro-democracy-leaders-arrested-at.html.
68. Orlando Gutierrez-Boronat, Resistance to the Regime is Here to Stay, MIAMI
HERALD, Sept. 5, 2010, http://www.miamiherald.com/2010/09/05/1808547/resistance-
to-the-regime-is-here.html#ixzzl2AbXJYvR.
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The Cuban government recognizes the danger that indepen-
dent civic engagement poses to its control over its population.
Increasing independent access to information, communication,
and external engagement with the rest of the world is something
the Cuban government has tried to limit and manage, even as it
has expanded its own external relations for economic gain. Never-
theless, independent Cuban actors are being recognized around
the world for their courage in defending human rights and free-
dom of expression in Cuba. The Atlantic Council also presented
the Ladies in White with its 2010 Freedom Award.7" This was fol-
lowed by the European Parliament's awarding of its Sakharov
Prize for Freedom of Thought to Guillermo Farinas.7' Farinas'
receipt of this award marks the third time since 2002 that the
Sakharov Prize has been awarded to Cuban activists. Previous
recipients were Osvaldo Paya in 2002 and the Ladies in White in
2005.72
At the same time, the island's poor economy and the govern-
ment's need for capital have placed the Cuban government at a
crossroads where the path to economic growth inherently implies
a weakening of its own centralized power. Speeches by Raiil Cas-
tro and debate among Cuban officials about how to make the
country more productive have continued for more than two
years.73 In August 2010, Radil Castro stated in a speech before the
National Assembly, "[w]e have to erase forever the notion that
Cuba is the only country in the world where it is not necessary to
work."7 However, actual actions on the part of the government
have been limited or almost inconsequential for most Cuban citi-
zens. In 2009, the economy again failed to meet original economic
growth forecasts, this time by more than 66 percent.75 The Cuban
69. Id.
70. Wroclaw Global Forum, ATLANTIC COUNCIL (Oct. 6, 2010), http://www.acus.org/
event/wroclaw-global-forum.
71. The Sakharov Prize honors exceptional individuals who have demonstrated
courage to defend human rights and the freedom of expression. See 2010 Sakharov
Prize Goes to Cuban Dissident Guillermo Farifias, EuR. PARLIAMENT, http:/www.
europarl.europa.eu/news/public/focus-page/015-84708-274-10-40-90220101001FCS84
570-01-10-2010-2010/default pOOlcOO4_en.htm.
72. Id.
73. See Frank, supra note 9.
74. Radil Castro Ruz, General of the Army, Speech Given at the 5th Ordinary
Session of the 7th Legislature of the National Assembly of People's Power (Aug. 1,
2010), available at http://www.granma.cu/ingles/cuba-i/2agosto-discursoraul.html.
75. See Juan 0. Tamayo, Cuba Faced Worst Economic Crisis in '09, MIAMI
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government responded by implementing new austerity measures
such as ration card reductions, a law permitting Cuban citizens to
work more than one job, and the closure of certain government
cafeterias, which were replaced by a lunch stipend." The need to
take these measures further alienated citizens who already often
have to break the law, steal, or hustle to meet daily requirements
while living with the paranoia that the government can decide at
any time to prosecute them for simply trying to survive."
One consequence of this has been that criticism and calls for
reform by Cuban citizens are more and more common. Indepen-
dent organizations, which struggle to exist despite government
repression, are active in calling for more economic opportunities
for Cuban citizens. For example, the Latin American Federation
of Rural Women (FLAMUR) submitted more than 10,000 signa-
tures to the Cuban National Assembly in support of their Con la
Misma Moneda (With the Same Currency) campaign calling on
the Cuban government to address issues that stem from the dual
currency system. 8 When Cuban citizens are asked what their
number one concern is, more than one-half (fifty-two percent) cite
worries about low salaries, the high cost of living, and challenges
with the island's double-currency system.79
Largely because of criticisms and calls for reform, beginning
in 2007, the Cuban government under Radil Castro initiated the
use of grassroots structures to undertake "consultations with the
people" in which citizens were encouraged to express their needs,
even allowing pointed criticism of government performance - as
long as such criticisms did not question the legitimacy of the gov-
ernment. 0 Given the wide thematic and geographic scope of the
HERALD, Jan. 1, 2010, http://www.miamiherald.com/2001/12/31/1405416/cuba-faced-
worst-economic-crisis.html (discussing the 2009 economic situation in Cuba).
76. See The Demise of the Free Lunch, ECONOMIST (Oct. 8, 2009), http://www.
economist.com/node/14587237.
77. For a discussion of the contradictions in Cuban society, see BEN CORBETT, THIS
IS CUBA: AN OUTLAW CULTURE SURVIVEs (Westview Press, 2002).
78. See Entregan 10,489 Nuevas Firmas en Apoyo a la Campaia "Con la Misma
Moneda," FLAMUR CUBA (Nov. 25, 2009, 1:56 AM), http://flamurcuba.org/artman2/
publish/Inicio Noticias/Entregan_10 489_nuevasfirmasenapoyo.a la-Campa-a_
Con laMismaMoneda.shtml.
79. Cuban Public Opinion Survey, THE INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE
(July 4-Aug. 7, 2009), http://www.iri.org/sites/defaulttfiles/2009-November-17-Survey-
of-Cuban-Public-Opinion-July-4-August-7-2009.pdf.
80. See generally Raul Castro Ruz, President of the State Council and the Council
of Ministers, Year 50th of the Revolution (Feb. 24, 2008), available at http:!!emba
cuba.cubaminrex.culDefault.aspx?tabid=7329 ("In those cases where it is deemed
necessary, there will be a previous consultation with the people in the corresponding
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meetings and the suggestion of reform, which Radil himself pub-
licly articulated, these sessions contributed to increased citizen
expectations. However, almost two years after Rafil Castro for-
mally assumed the presidency of Cuba, more than four in five citi-
zens (eighty-two percent) responded in a survey sponsored by the
International Republican Institute that they did not believe
things were going well in Cuba. In fact, the survey demonstrated
that a vast majority of Cubans would vote for fundamental politi-
cal change (seventy-five percent) and economic change (eighty-six
percent) if given the opportunity. Moreover, approximately two-
thirds (sixty-six percent) of Cubans do not believe that their gov-
ernment will succeed in solving Cuba's most pressing challenges .81
Since the hurricanes of 2008 and the subsequent drought in 2010,
Cuba has struggled to meet the needs of its population while con-
tinuing to be impacted by the global economic downturn, all of
which has affected the government's capacity to compensate for
production inefficiencies through import substitution.
In 2009, in a move more desperate than reform-minded, the
Cuban government began to undertake small pilot initiatives
ranging from the opening of government-administered retail mer-
chandise outlets selling items in Cuban pesos, which previously
could only be purchased with hard currency, to permitting dairy
producers to supply milk locally rather than through the ineffi-
cient central distribution system.8 2 However, agricultural produc-
tion in Cuba dropped 7.5 percent in the first half of 2010 compared
with the same period in 2009, in spite of government movement to
put more than one million hectares (2.5 million acres) of idle lands
into the hands of new producers to spur food production and
reduce imports. 3 At the same time, according to the Cuban
national statistics office, foreign investment dropped 14.7 percent
during the first half of 2010.14
Cuba's most dramatic move under Rail Castro has been the
sector of society, or even with the entire people, if it were a very transcendental
issue.").
81. Id. at 75.
82. See Juan Varela Perez, 6103 Bodegas ya la Reciben, GRANMA INT'L (Mar. 16,
2010, 9:00 PM), http://www.granma.cubaweb.cu/2010/03/16/nacional/artic01.html
(reporting on the increased use in local dairy distribution since 2007); see also Marc
Frank, In Cuba, Peso Makes a Comeback, Pleasing Customers, REUTERS (Feb. 1,
2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN0123504820100201?typeUSDollarRpt.
83. Agricultural Production Falls 7.5% in Cuba, LATIN AMERICAN HERALD
TRIBUNE, http:/Ilaht.com/article.asp?Articleld=362576&CategoryId=14510.
84. Oficina Nacional de Estadisticas (ONE), http://www.one.cu/.
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announced layoff of 500,000 workers. 85 Most of these workers will
be expected to survive economically through self-employment in
specific, legalized categories, or through the transformation of a
number of small state-owned businesses to co-operatives, now to
be run by their employees. In each of these cases, Cubans will be
expected to pay taxes and conform to regulations, the parameters
of which have yet to be laid out. 6
These developments are further signs that, in the economic
sector at least, the Cuban government is being forced to relinquish
some of the paternalistic control it can no longer afford to main-
tain. With no significant economic improvement for most citizens
on the horizon, or any meaningful personal freedoms, the frustra-
tions of Cuban citizens can be expected to continue to increase.
III. CUBA'S MANAGED GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT
As the average Cuban struggles to survive in a still largely
centralized economy, the Cuban government will continue its
strategy to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) that benefits
and reinforces the current power structure. Since 1990, foreign
capital by way of FDI has increased significantly, with FDI becom-
ing the biggest source of external financing for many countries,
regardless of their form of government."' Cuba has not been
outside this evolution in the international economic structure, at
least in terms of attracting FDI.ss Rather, since the loss of Soviet
subsidies, the Cuban government has sought to harness the global
economy for its own survival purposes.89
85. Tamayo, supra note 3.
86. For discussions on Cuba's recent economic announcements, see Jose Azel, Is
Cuba Moving Towards Capitalism?, CUBA TRANSITION PROJECT, INST. FOR CUBAN AND
CUBAN-AM. STUDIES, UNIV. OF MIAMI 132 (Sept. 27, 2010); Mario A. Gonzalez-Corzo,
The Reduction of State-Sector Workers in Cuba, CUBA TRANSITION PROJECT, INST. FOR
CUBAN AND CUBAN-AM. STUDIES, UNIV. OF MIAMI 133 (Oct. 12, 2010). See also Jose
Azel, So Much for Cuban Economic Reform, WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 2011, http://online.
wsj.com/article/SB 10001424052970203418804576039640218425926.html.
87. See Foreign Aid and Foreign Investment, WORLD BANK, http://www.worldbank.
org/depweb/beyond/beyondco/beg_13.pdf (describing the forms of financial flows to
countries and the rise in private capital flows, specifically the increase in foreign
direct investment).
88. See Omar Everleny Perez Villanueva, Cuba: An Overview of Foreign Direct
Investment (2002), http-//www2.carleton.ca/economics/ccms/wp-content/ccms-files/cep
02-04.pdf (discussing Cuba's opening to foreign resources).
89. See Leandro Venacio, La Inversi6n Extranjera Directa y la Crisis Econ6mica
Cubana [Direct Foreign Investment and the Cuban Economic Crisis] (2005), http://
www.eumed.netllibros/2005/lv/ (discussing the benefits Cuba derives from foreign
investment).
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New laws, regulations, and agreements implemented since
the early 1990s have served to attract foreign investment to Cuba.
However, the extent to which these instruments have substan-
tively improved the framework for investment on the island
remains questionable.90 The government continues to rule by fear
and repression, stifling creativity and innovation. Further, the
economic engagement of multinational businesses with Cuba has
not produced fundamental changes in the daily lives of Cuban citi-
zens. For the Cuban government, maintaining absolute political
power has been more important than anything else, including the
welfare of the Cuban people.
A. Economic Policy: 1959 - 2009
Prior to the Cuban Revolution in 1959, a significant amount
of foreign direct investment, largely from the United States, was
in place on the island.9 Foreign companies wishing to do business
on the island simply had to register with the Cuban government
and comply with local laws.2 There were few special restrictions
or other constraints on foreign investors. Following the emergence
of the revolutionary government, foreign companies, including
U.S. companies, were nationalized and the property of foreign
nationals expropriated, leaving foreign investment in the country
virtually non-existent for more than thirty years. 3 Until the early
1990s, Cuba shared preferential trade relationships with the for-
mer Soviet Union and its satellites. In effect, Cuba ended its
dependency on the United States and replaced it with reliance on
the largesse of the Soviet Union.
From its open embrace of Soviet communism in the 1960s
through 1991, Cuba's number one trading partner was the Soviet
Union. Cuba exported sixty-three percent of its sugar to the Soviet
Union, along with seventy-three percent of its nickel, ninety-five
90. Matias F. Travieso-Diaz & Alejandro Ferrate, Recommended Features of a
Foreign Investment Code for Cuba's Free Market Transition, 21 N.C.J. INT'L L. & CoM.
REG. 511, 513-14 (1996).
91. See Eric Baklanoff, Cuba on the Eve of the Socialist Transition: A
Reassessment of the Backwardness-Stagnation Thesis, in 8 CUBA IN TRANSITION:
PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE EIGHTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE ASSOCIATION FOR
THE STUDY OF THE CUBAN ECONOMy 268-71 (1998), available at http://lanic.utexas.
edulla/ca/cuba/asce/cuba8/3lbaklanoff.pdf.
92. Id.
93. See MICHAEL W. GORDON, THE CUBAN NATIONALIZATIONS: THE DEMISE OF
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CUBA 69-108 (1976) (providing a history of the expropriation
process).
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percent of its citrus, and 100 percent of its electricity exports.9 4
Cuba, in return, received ninety percent of its machinery from the
Soviet Union and ninety-eight percent of its fuel needs. 5
The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 sent a series of
shocks through the Cuban economy. In the following four years,
eighty percent of Cuba's exchange capacity was lost.9 This
ushered in an economic depression known as the "Special
Period."97 In response, the Cuban government made the tactical
decision to modify policies to prioritize food production, reduce
overall consumption, allow greater foreign direct investment,
restructure and diversify its trade relationships, and develop the
tourism, biotechnology and pharmaceuticals industries. 8
As early as the 1980s, Cuba determined that it needed tech-
nology and new markets to revive certain sectors, including tour-
ism.9 To facilitate investment while maintaining control and
containing any unwanted influences, the Cuban government
revised its legal structure to provide a framework for FDI. Legisla-
tive Decree 50, the first of these measures, was passed in 1982,
permitting foreign investment on the island in the form of joint
ventures between foreign companies and Cuban enterprises. 1°°
This decree resulted in a joint venture between a Cuban entity
and a Spanish company to build a resort in Varadero. 10' However,
foreign investment remained stagnant as the language of this
94. CANADA, THE UNITED STATES, AND CUBA 15 (Sahadeo Basdeo et al. eds., North-
South Center Press, 2002).
95. Id.
96. SucHLicKi, supra note 11. See also Joy Gordon, Cuba's Entrepreneurial
Socialism, ATLANTIC MONTHLY (Jan. 1997), http://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/
issues/97jan/cuba/cuba.htm (discussing Cuba's loss of its primary trading partner).
97. See Archibald R. M. Ritter, Cuba's Strategic Economic Re-Orientation, ASS'N
FOR THE STUDY OF THE CUBAN ECON. (2006), http://lanic.utexas.edu/project/asce/pdfs/
volumel6/pdfs/ritter.pdf (discussing economic reformulation starting in the nineties
with the end of the special relationship with the former Soviet Union).
98. For a journalistic perspective on Cuba's post-Soviet era efforts to address
economic realities, including efforts to harness tourism for the government's benefit,
see CORBETT, supra note 77, at 20-29.
99. Jesus R. Mercador, Reality of Labor in Cuba and the Social Responsibility of
Foreign Investors (2006), at 129 (discussing the background to Cuban Law 77 of 1995
on foreign investment).
100. Jorge F. P~rez-L6pez, Foreign Investment in Cuba: An Inventory, CUBA IN
TRANSITION (2004), available at http://www.cubastudygroup.org/index.cfn/files/serve?
Fileid=76779219-61b8-4c76-ble7-338796686dac (outlining the forms of foreign
investment).
101. See F6lix Blanco Godnez, Cuba's Tourism Industry: Sol Melid as a Case
Study, 8 CUBA IN TRANSITION 50 (1998) (providing a case study of Sol MehiA, the
leading foreign corporation in the Cuban tourism industry).
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decree was very general and did not authorize the creation of full
foreign ownership companies.
In 1992, a series of changes to Cuban property laws provided
for the express capacity of investors to acquire a long-term lease to
property on the island and participate in production
agreements.102
The 1982 and 1992 changes were further solidified in 1995
when the Cuban government approved Law 77, the "Foreign
Investment Act," which replaced Law 50.103 Law 77 serves as the
primary legal framework for investment on the island.104 It out-
lines the principal legal structures for the implementation of
investment projects in Cuba: 1.) international association con-
tracts; 2.) joint ventures or mixed companies; and 3.) completely
foreign-owned companies. 10 5 Investment regulations are developed
and enforced by the Ministry of Foreign Investment and Economic
Cooperation (MINVEC), established in 1994 by the Council of
State. MINVEC coordinates all investment activity in the country,
including the processing and negotiation of foreign investment
applications."16
Law 77 also requires that foreign investors must hire Cuban
workers, with limited exceptions, through a Cuban government
employment agency designated by MINVEC. °7 This employment
102. The basis for long-term lease arrangements rests on a 1992 revision of the
Cuban Constitution, available at http://www.uiowa.edu/ifdebook/issues/cuba/docs/
law-governmentConstitution976withAMEND.pdf. Article 23 of the 1992
constitution states, "El Estado reconoce la propiedad de las empresas mixtas,
sociedades y asociaciones econ6micas que se constituyen conforme a la ley. El uso,
disfrute y disposici6n de los bienes pertenecientes al patrimonio de las entidades
anteriores se rigen por lo establecido en la ley y los tratados, asi como por los
estatutos y reglamentos propios por los que se gobiernan." [Informal translation: "The
State recognizes the property of joint ventures, companies and economic associations
that are formed in accordance with the law. The use, enjoyment and disposition of
property belonging to the above entities are governed by the provisions of the law and
treaties and by the statutes and regulations that they themselves are governed by."].
103. Constitucion de la Republica de Cuba art. 18, Presentation of the Law on
Foreign Investment, Decree-Law No. 77 (Sept. 4, 1995) [hereinafter referred to as
Law 77], available at http://ctp.iccas.miami.edu/LawDocs/ldlOO132.pdf.
104. See Antonio R. Zamora, Cuba's New Foreign Investment Law: Better, Worse or
the Same as Before?, 4 Focus AMERicAS 3 (1996).
105. See Law 77, supra note 103, at ch. V, art. 12. Article 12 states that foreign
investment should adopt one of the three forms.
106. See Mercador, supra note 99, at 132 (outlining the administrative
requirements for foreign investment in Cuba).
107. See Law 77, supra note 103, at ch. XI, art. 31. Article 31 states the labor
system extends to all workers who provide services in the activities of foreign services
or foreigners who are permanent residents in Cuba. Exceptions are made for certain
top administrative positions or some posts of a technical nature, which may be filled
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agency contracts with the foreign investor for the provision of
labor and wages, then pays Cuban workers their salaries and ben-
efits in domestic currency (pesos) while the foreign investor pays
the Cuban government in hard currency. 08 Resolution No. 3/96 of
the Ministry of Labor and Social Security establishes the rules for
workers of foreign companies operating in Cuba, including the cir-
cumstances under which a Cuban worker may be dismissed. °9
Law 77 also established a structure for the establishment of
"Free Trade Zones" or industrial parks, where tax and other bene-
fits would be provided to foreign investors choosing to invest in
these geographical locations.11 ° In these cases, "a special system
can be established covering customs duties, exchange rates, taxa-
tion, labor, migration, public order, capital investment and foreign
trade, and in which foreign investors can participate."" Further,
the law allows for the establishment of special labor rules in these
areas.
In an effort to further strengthen investor confidence in Cuba
while addressing some of the questions left by Law 77, Cuba has
signed bilateral investment agreements (BITs) with more than
twenty-eight countries.1" This makes BIT one of the most widely
used types of international agreement for foreign investment on
the island. These agreements are meant to provide equal treat-
ment for foreign investment, facilitate repatriation of profits, and
by non-Cuban nationals and the labor rights, conditions and obligations may be
determined by the company.
108. Id.
109. Resolucion No. 3/96 - Reglamento sobre el regimen laboral en la inversion
extranjera, G.O. 266-72 (Mar. 27, 1996) (Cuba). Additionally, Article 32 of Law 77
allows for the establishment of "economic incentive funds" for Cuban workers and
foreign permanent residents working in the activities of the foreign company. The
contributions to the fund are to be established from the profits of the foreign company
and the amount of the contribution is decided on by relevant parties of the foreign
company and the ministry of foreign and economic collaboration. See Law 77, supra
note 103, at ch. XI, art. 32 (describing the parameters of the economic incentive
funds). Specifically, Article 32 states, "[tihe amount of these contributions shall be
agreed upon between the joint ventures, foreign investors and national investors who
are party to international economic-association contracts, and totally foreign capital
companies, on the one hand, and the Ministry of Foreign Investment and Economic
Cooperation, on the other hand.").
110. Law 77, supra note 103, at ch. XV, art. 50. See also, Ministerio para la
Inversion Extranjera y la Colaboracion Economica, Decreto-ley No. 165 - Ley sobre
zonas francas y parques industriales (June 3, 1996), available at http://www.cuba.cul
negocioslDL165E.htm.
111. Law 77, supra note 103, at ch. XV, art. 51.
112. See Investment Instruments Online: Bilateral Investment Treaties, United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development, httpJ/www.unctadxi.org/templates/
DocSearch.aspx?id=779 (last visited Dec.18, 2009).
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establish procedures for the arbitration of disputes. Ideally, BITs
allow multinational businesses to redress breaches of core eco-
nomic obligations through direct arbitration. To maintain appear-
ances of a commitment to international standards, and in
accordance with these agreements, in 2007 Cuba updated its arbi-
tration system and created the Cuban Court of International Com-
mercial Arbitration, which is part of the Cuban Chamber of
Commerce.113 However, the arbitration court has been criticized
for its lack of impartiality and independence."4
According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development, Cuba increased FDI flows from $7 million in 1990-
2000 to $17 million in 2007."' Tourism, oil and gas, mining,
energy, and telecommunications are reportedly the primary sec-
tors of foreign investment on the island."6 Investors in Cuba
represent about forty countries, but are mostly from Spain,
France, Canada, and Italy and operate in thirty-two sectors of the
economy." 7 While mechanisms such as Law 77 and BITs created a
framework for investment on the island, they neither changed the
larger economic environment nor significantly altered the govern-
ment institutions that regulate the economy. Many obstacles
remain for the foreign investor; high taxes, a burdensome regula-
tory structure, and centralized control of labor all hinder busi-
nesses in Cuba. The Cuban state maintains virtually all control of
the hiring and firing of employees, including decisions on discipli-
nary measures and compensation for performance." 8 Further, the
areas set aside for investment remain limited and are designed to
prevent all but the most controlled contact between Cuban citi-
zens and foreigners, yet another way in which the Cuban govern-
ment meticulously manages its global engagement. Additionally,
Cuba lacks a comprehensive set of commercial laws to govern bus-
113. See De la Corte Cubana de Arbitraje Comercio Internacional [Cuban Court of
International Commercial Arbitration Act] Decreto-Ley [Law] No. 250 (2007) (Cuba).
114. See Kevin Tuininga, International Commercial Arbitration in Cuba, 22 EMORY
L. REVIEW 571 (2009) (discussing commercial arbitration practices in Cuba).
115. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment
Report: Cuba, (2008), available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite-dir/docs/wir
08_fs.cu.en.pdf. Detailed quantitative data on foreign investment in Cuba is
inadequate as access to information is limited, reliant on opaque state agencies.
116. Foreign Investment in Cuba, INVESTMENT PROMOTION CENTER OF THE MINISTRY
FOR FOREIGN INVESTMENT FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF CUBA, http://www.cubagov.cul
ingles/otras-info/cpiinversionl.htm [hereinafter Cuba Investment Promotion Center]
(last visited Oct. 21, 2010).
117. Paolo Spadoni, Foreign Investment in Cuba: Recent Developments and Role in
the Economy, 12 CUBA IN TRANSITION 158, 163 (2002).
118. Mercador, supra note 99, at 134.
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iness transactions and operations. And the Cuban government
can change the rules at anytime, with limited recourse available
to investors, despite the presence of a BIT or other agreement. 119
For instance, in late 2008-early 2009, the Cuban government froze
the accounts of several investors, reportedly amounting to hun-
dreds of millions of dollars. After months of stalling, the Cuban
government finally offered foreign businesses a payment plan for
their frozen assets at two percent interest over five years, "with
the proviso that payments can be missed without penalty when
money is not available."2 °
Overall, the changes to Cuba's foreign direct investment laws
may appear to provide the legal basis for foreign direct invest-
ment, but the legal culture and business environment are "not
conducive to private sector growth.' 12' The annual Index of Eco-
nomic Freedom, published by the Wall Street Journal and the
Heritage Foundation, further confirms this. Cuba's economy is
one of the least free in the world. It places twenty-ninth of the
twenty-nine countries ranked in the Latin America and Caribbean
region, and it shares the distinction of being among the least free
economies in the world, just ahead of Zimbabwe and North Korea.
When analyzing the trends across time, rather than steadily
improving its score, there has been deterioration since the 2003-
2005 period. The 2011 Index sums up the investment climate as
follows: "In practice, investment is inhibited by a lack of business
policy, arbitrary and non-transparent regulation, discrimination
against foreign and private domestic investment, and state control
of the economy. Private-sector opportunities are limited."22
B. Foreign Investment and Human Rights Abuses
"What do you want to be when you grow up?" a father asks his
son in a popular joke in Cuba; "a tourist," he replies. This story
captures the reality of economic life in Cuba. Tourists are envied,
and Cuban citizens working in the tourism sector can earn much
119. Hans de Salas del Valle, Caveat Investor: Realities of Doing Business in Cuba,
88 Focus ON CUB3A (Aug. 20, 2007), available at http://ctp.iccas.miami.edu/FOCUS_
Web/Issue88.htm.
120. Marc Frank, Cuba Offers Payback Plan for Frozen Bank Accounts, REUTERS
(Mar. 2, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN0215925320100302.
121. United States Agency for International Development, Cuba Economic
Performance Assessment (Highlights of Cuba's Performance) (2009), http://pdf.usaid.
gov/pdLdocs/PNADQ895.pdf.
122. The Heritage Foundation and Wall Street Journal, 2011 Index of Economic
Freedom: Cuba, available at http://www.heritage.orglIndex/Country/Cuba.
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more than a doctor or lawyer or engineer on the state salary.123
However, foreign direct investment in Cuba also has another,
darker side.
In 2008, a vivid example of exploitative Cuban labor practices
was the basis of a claim in the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Florida. Known as "the Curacao Drydock workers case,"
the court awarded $50 million in compensatory damages and $30
million in punitive damages under the Alien Tort Claims Act and
the Torture Victim Protection Act for what can best be termed
slave labor violations.124
The court found that the defendant, Curacao Drydock, con-
spired with Cuba to force the workers into labor camps to repair
ships and oil platforms. Over a period of fifteen years the three
workers were among 50 to 100 laborers who were trafficked to the
site to work over sixteen hours a day to earn hard foreign currency
for the Cuban government. 2 5 The workers produced the agree-
ment between the Defendant and a Cuban state entity that
directly outlined the debt Cuba owed Curacao Drydock, which fur-
ther stated that the debt would be paid with labor - the labor
that the three workers in this case and their colleagues
provided. '26
The three workers escaped the labor camp and were subse-
quently granted permission to enter the United States. Since
then, they have been sought by the Cuban government, and their
families who remain on the island face continued repression.'27
The workers testified to intimidation, threats of persecution, and
imprisonment during their time in Curacao. 2 " Furthermore, the
working conditions were abysmal, resulting in several work-
related injuries to the workers.'29 The court concluded that the
defendant's conduct was "egregiousness," played a central role in
the conspiracy, and contributed to the subjugation of the Cuban
people 130
This case is illustrative of the Cuban government's view of
123. See Luis Locay, The Future of Cuba's Labor Market: Prospects and
Recommendations, CUBA TRANSITION PROJECT (2004), http://ctp.iccas.miami.edu/
Research Studies/LLocay.pdf.
124. Rodriguez Licea v. Curacao Drydock Co., 584 F. Supp. 2d 1355 (S.D. Fla.
2008).
125. Id. at 1357.
126. Id. at 1363.
127. Id. at 1357.
128. Id. at 1361.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1366.
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Cuban workers as chattel, whose labor is for the benefit of the
state. It is also demonstrative of the willingness of some entities
doing business in or with Cuba to conspire in the ill treatment of
the Cuban people and ignore internationally recognized labor and
human rights standards.
IV. U.S. POLICY TOWARD CASTRO'S CUBA
The fall of the Soviet Union with its accompanying end of sub-
sidies to Cuba and the Cuban government's subsequent turn to
foreign (third-country) investment as a potentially significant
source of revenue prompted renewed attention in the United
States on the instrumentalities of U.S. policy.131 This new atten-
tion also involved the shifting of policy-setting on Cuba from the
Executive Branch to Congress.
In the 1990s, legislators from both major parties concluded
that the U.S. president lacked the interest to pursue what Con-
gress considered to be new opportunities to increase the pressure
for change in Cuba; on the contrary, he appeared to be tempted to
"normalize" the bilateral relationship without regard to whether
there were more open political and economic conditions in Cuba.132
This was evidenced by congressional actions to step into the policy
void with legislative initiatives to strengthen the economic pres-
sure on Cuba and mandate more vigorous Executive Branch sanc-
tions enforcement, while recognizing the need to maintain
avenues for interaction with the Cuban people. 133 By the end of
that decade, however, congressional activism took another turn,
this time towards liberalizing the embargo for the limited purpose
of allowing, either through third-country financing or cash-in-
advance transactions, the sale of food and agricultural products to
Cuba."'
In general terms, U.S. policy towards Cuba since 1959 has
had a dual track: one element being continued U.S. pressure on
131. Observation based on the author's experience with or involvement in the
policy discussions on Cuba and U.S. policy towards that country.
132. Id. See also Daniel W, Fisk, Cuba in U.S. Policy: An American Congressional
Perspective, in CANADA, THE US AND CUBA: HELMS-BURTON AND ITS ArERMATH 27, 27-
56 (Heather N. Nicol, ed. 1999)
133. Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-484, 106 Stat. 2575 (1992)
(codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 6001 (2010)) [hereinafter CDA; Cuban Liberty
and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-114, 110 Stat.
785 (1996) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 6021 (2010)) [hereinafter LIBERTAD
Act]. The CDA is Title XVII of the "National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1993."
134. Trade Sanctions Reform and Enhancement Act of 2000, 22 U.S.C. § 79 (2010).
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Havana; another being the maintenance of avenues of communi-
cation to either the Cuban government or the Cuban people, or
both, and the occasional exploration of areas for government-to-
government cooperation.135 From the earliest days of the revolu-
tionary government, there also have been moments of exploring
moves towards establishing a more "normal" bilateral
relationship.136
As one historian of the United States' relationship with Latin
America noted, in 1959 "the [U.S.] administration prepared to
work with the new Cuban regime, despite President Eisenhower's
expressed misgivings."1 37 This was short-lived, as Washington
recoiled at the new Cuban government's summary executions,
property expropriations, and political turn to Moscow. 1 3 President
John Kennedy also gave thought to and made some initial ges-
tures towards a rapprochement with Cuba, as we know from
declassified documents from his administration. '39
In the 1970s, there were again efforts toward reducing ten-
sions and normalizing relations, with the Nixon and Ford Admin-
istrations pursuing some tentative approaches to Havana. As part
of this effort, in 1975, the U.S. embargo was modified to allow U.S.
foreign subsidiaries to trade with Cuba.10 Under the Carter
Administration, the United States lifted the ban on travel to
Cuba.' Further, it negotiated the establishment of "interests sec-
tions" - diplomatic offices that fall short of a formal embassy - in
135. For U.S. government outreach to Cuba during the Kennedy, Nixon, and Carter
Administrations, see Cuba and the U.S.: Road Map on Efforts to Improve Relations
Revealed in Declassified Documents, NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE (Jan. 22, 2009),
http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB269/index.htm.
136. STEPHEN G. RABE, EISENHOWER AND LATIN AMERICA: THE FOREIGN POLICY OF
ANTICOMMUNISM 122 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press 1988)
137. Id. at 122.
138. Id.
139. See Cuba and the U.S.: Road Map on Efforts to Improve Relations Revealed in
Declassified Documents, supra note 135.
140. See Chronology of US-Cuban Relations, 1958-1998, U.S. INTERESTS SECTION IN
HAVANA, http://havana.usint.gov/uploads/images/ypJlFsSBY-nmKb3Z2qZ7Rw/
CHRONOLOGY5898.pdf. See also, KENNETH A. RODMAN, SANCTIONS BEYOND
BORDERS: MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND U.S. ECONOMIC STATECRAFT 114-116
(Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 2001); National Security Archive, NATIONAL
SECURITY COUNCIL, MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY KISSINGER, CONFIDENTIAL, 'CUBA
POLICY,' Aug. 30, 1974, http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB269/index.
htm.
141. See MARK P. SULLIVAN, CUBA: U.S. RESTRICTIONS ON TRAVEL AND REMITTANCES
2 (Congressional Research Service 2010); see also, LARS SCHOULTZ, THAT INFERNAL
LITTLE CUBAN REPUBLIC: THE UNITED STATES AND THE CUBAN REVOLUTION 291-361
(The University of North Carolina Press 2009).
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Havana and Washington in 1977.142
Beginning in the late 1970s and continuing into the 1980s,
Cuban military involvement in Africa, its support for revolution-
ary movements in Central America and the Caribbean, and the
question of repatriating to Cuba criminal exiles from the Mariel
exodus undercut these outreach efforts by the United States.14 1
Both Secretaries of State in the Reagan Administration, Alexan-
der M. Haig, Jr. (1981-1982) and George P. Shultz (1982 - Janu-
ary 1989) noted in their respective memoirs the Administration's
concerns about Cuban support to guerrillas in El Salvador and the
presence of Cuban military advisors in Nicaragua. Haig addition-
ally noted the Cuban presence in Africa, while Shultz referenced
the Cuban role in Grenada."' Despite efforts at dialogue early in
the Reagan Administration, including the dispatch of envoy
Vernon Walters to Havana, Cuban adventurism prompted the
Administration to return to a harder-line policy, including re-
imposing restrictions on travel to Cuba.145 As noted at the outset of
this section, U.S. sanctions were strengthened twice in the 1990s
through legislation.4 6 Both pieces of legislation also authorized
the provision of support to the Cuban people. 47
142. See Robert Pastor, The Carter Administration and Latin America: A Test of
Principle, THE CARTER CENTER (1992), http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/
bitstreams/5130.pdf; see also, National Security Archive, op. cit., President Directive/
NSC-6, 'Cuba,' Mar. 15, 1977, signed by President Jimmy Carter, http://www.gwu.
edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB269/docO8.pdf and http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.
gov/documents/pddirectives/pd06.pdf.
143. See Pastor, supra note 142 ("But Cuba's military cooperation with the U.S.S.R.
in Africa was an insurmountable obstacle to normalization, and as it expanded, it also
began to affect American relations with the Soviet Union."); Richard C. Thornton, The
Carter Years: Toward A New Global Order, CHAPTER 8: SALT II, CUBA, AND CENTRAL
AMERICA: THE PURSUIT OF ILLUSION (House, 2007) 358 ("Formal talks in the spring led
to agreements on fisheries and maritime boundaries, and later in the year interests
sections were opened in both capitals. But Cuba's heavy involvement in Ethiopia in
late 1977 brought Washington's initiative to a standstill."). See also ALEXANDER M.
HAIG, JR., CAVEAT: REALISM, REAGAN, AND FOREIGN POLICY (Macmillian 1984);
GEORGE P. SHULTZ, TURMOIL AND TRIUMPH: MY YEARS AS SECRETARY OF STATE
(Scribner's 1993). For U.S. preoccupation with migration, see The Reagan Diaries,
Ed., Douglas Brinkley (Harper Collins 2007), entries regarding Cuba in 1981 and
1982.
144. See HAIG, supra note 143; see also SHULTZ, supra note 143.
145. See HAIG, supra note 143, at 132-137. See also Reagan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222
(1984) (upholding the President's authority to restrict travel to Cuba by U.S.
nationals).
146. Rodriguez Licea v. Curacao Drydock Co., 584 F. Supp. 2d 1355 (S.D. Fla.
2008).
147. CDA, 22 U.S.C. § 6004 (2010) ("Support for the Cuban People"); LIBERTAD
Act, 22 U.S.C. § 6039 (2010) ("Authorization of support for democratic and human
rights groups and international observers.").
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The Cuban Democracy Act (CDA), introduced by Congress-
man Robert Torricelli, Democrat of New Jersey, reflected congres-
sional frustration with the George H.W. Bush Administration's
"lack of a proactive policy to hasten the downfall of the Castro
regime and to promote a peaceful, orderly transition to democ-
racy."14 The bill also reflected the growth of a politically-active
Cuban-American constituency, which worked with Congressman
Torricelli and other Members of Congress on the legislation.149 The
George H.W. Bush Administration initially hesitated in its sup-
port of the legislation, including taking some steps to negate the
need for legislation,15 ° but election year politics helped dictate oth-
erwise, especially when the Democrat candidate for president,
then-Governor Bill Clinton of Arkansas, embraced the
legislation."'
In keeping with the dual-track approach to Cuba, the CDA
banned U.S. foreign subsidiary trade with Cuba152 while also
authorizing donations of food, the export of medicines and medical
supplies, and the expansion of telecommunications services.5 3 The
CDA provision allowing the donation and sale of medicines and
medicals supplies to Cuba5 4 has resulted in the authorization of
more than $750 million in aid since the bill's enactment.1 How-
ever, the Cuban government has not taken full advantage of this
availability; what has actually shipped is far less, maybe by sev-
eral hundreds of millions of dollars.1 56 The Castro propaganda
148. Consideration of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992: Hearings and Markup:
Hearing on H.R. 4168 and H.R. 5323 before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 102nd
Congress 2d Session 76 (1992) (opening statement of Hon. Robert G. Torricelli).
149. Christopher Marquis, Embargo Bill's Success Testified to Exiles' Clout, MIAMi
HERALD, Sept. 28, 1992, at Al.
150. U.S. Adds Pressure on Cuba; Bush Bars Ships that Defied Curbs, BOSTON
GLOBE, Apr. 19, 1992, at 2. For the Bush Administration's concerns about the
legislation, see Consideration of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992: Hearings and
Markup on H.R. 4168 and H.R. 5323 before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 102nd
Congress 355-83 (1992) (statement of Robert S. Gelbard, Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Department of State).
151. Pamela Constable, Clinton Could Face Pressure on Cuba, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov.
4, 1992, at 2; see also BILL CLINTON, My LIFE 615 (2004).
152. CDA, 22 U.S.C. § 6005.
153. CDA, 22 U.S.C. § 6004 (b)-(e). This section, in subsection (d), also required
onsite verification regarding the delivery of medical supplies, unless provided to a
non-governmental organization in Cuba for medical or humanitarian purposes.
154. CDA, 22 U.S.C. § 6004(c).
155. Exports and Reexports to Cuba, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF
INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, http://www.bis.doc.gov/policiesandregulations/regional
considerations/cuba.pdf.
156. Id.; see also Written Statement of Grant D. Aldonas Under Sec'y for Int'l Trade
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apparatus tries to make points by claiming that the lack of
medicines and medical supplies in Cuba is a result of U.S. poli-
cies.157 The reality is that the failure to adequately provide
medicines and medical supplies rests in Havana. This is not a case
of U.S. policy getting in the way; it is rather a situation where
Cuba has chosen not to pursue purchases to the detriment of the
Cuban people.1 8
A similar frustration with presidential inaction towards Cuba
and over-reaction to events in Haiti, combined with perceptions of
a presidential agenda to re-orient the bilateral U.S.-Cuba rela-
tionship without corresponding political and economic reforms on
the island, resulted in another congressional effort to consolidate
the policy. This time the chief protagonists were a Democrat Pres-
ident, Bill Clinton, and Republican Senator Jesse Helms of North
Carolina. Unlike Torricelli who was a newcomer to the Cuba
issue when he introduced the Cuban Democracy Act, Helms had
built a Senate career on anti-communism, including opposition to
Castro's Cuba and attention to developments in Latin America.159
As Helms summed it up in his memoirs, "Fidel Castro survived
the Clinton years for one reason: the Clinton administration never
made the dictator's removal from power a goal of its foreign policy"
[emphasis in original].16
In February 1996, Cuban military jets shot down two U.S.
civilian planes, killing four U.S. nationals. This brutal action by
Cuba led to congressional approval of the Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity Act and its signing into law by President
Clinton.161 More commonly known as the LIBERTAD Act or
Helms-Burton, this legislation further strengthened U.S. sanc-
tions while significantly expanding authorities to provide support
to the Cuban people.162
U.S Dep't of Commerce, THE U.S. SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, http://finance.senate.
gov/imo/media/dod090403gatest.pdf.
157. See Speech Delivered by Cuban Foreign Minister, Bruno Rodriguez Parrilla at
the United Nations Gen. Assembly, New York, Oct. 28, 2009, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS OF CUBA, http://www.cubaminrex.cu/English/UNGA/Articulos/64Session/
Statements/1028_ING.html; see also Embargo as Genocide? U.S., Cuba Spar Over it,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Dec. 4, 2009), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/34277833/ns/world_
news-americas/#.
158. Embargo as Genocide? U.S., Cuba Spar Over it, supra note 157.
159. See SENATOR JESSE HELMS, HERE'S WHERE I STAND: A MEMOIR (2005); see also
WILLIAM A. LINK, RIGHTEOUS WARRIOR: JESSE HELMS AND THE RISE OF MODERN
CONSERVATISM (2008).
160. HELMS, supra note 159, at 265.
161. LIBERTAD Act, 22 U.S.C. § 6021.
162. For background on the legislative history of the LIBERTAD Act, see Daniel W.
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The LIBERTAD Act also included a provision codifying the
embargo, including the restrictions "as in effect on March 1, 1996,"
until the President determines that a transition government is in
place in Cuba.163 According to the Conference Report accompany-
ing the LIBERTAD Act, Congress made it clear that:
It is the intent of the committee of conference that all eco-
nomic sanctions in force on March 1, 1996, shall remain in
effect until they are either suspended or terminated pursu-
ant to the authorities provided in section 204 of this Act
(requiring a Presidential determination that a democratic
transition is under way in Cuba). It is not the intent of this
section to prohibit executive branch agencies from amending
existing regulations to tighten economic sanctions on Cuba
or to implement the provisions of this Act [emphasis
added] .164
Despite the plain language of the LIBERTAD Act and the
accompanying explanation in the Conference Report, the Clinton
Administration interpreted the LIBERTAD provision as essen-
tially limited to the codification of the President's authority to pro-
mulgate and modify the Cuban Asset Control Regulations
(CACR)."'6 The Executive Branch based this interpretation on the
President's broad foreign affairs authority66 and authorities
existing under the Trading With the Enemy Act (TWEA) of 1917,
as amended.167 It is under this interpretation of the law that the
Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama Administrations adjusted
elements of U.S. policy towards Cuba, depending on their respec-
tive views of how the United States can best help the Cuban
people.
There has been little said publicly by the U.S. Executive
Fisk, Cuba in U.S. Policy: An American Congressional Perspective, in CANADA, THE
UNITED STATES AND CUBA: HELMS-BURTON AND ITS AFTERMATH 27, 27-56 (Heather N.
Nicol, ed., 1999); Daniel W. Fisk, Economic Sanctions: The Cuba Embargo Revisited,
in SANCTIONS AS ECONOMIC STATECRAFT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 65, 65-85 (Steve Chan
& A. Cooper Drury, eds., 2000); Daniel W. Fisk, Cuba in U.S. Foreign Policy: The
Emergence of a 'Post-Helms-Burton' Era?, in CANADA, THE UNITED STATES, AND CUBA:
AN EVOLVING RELATIONSHIP 95, 95-110 (Sahadeo Basdeo & Heather N. Nicol, eds.,
2002).
163. For criteria determining a transition government in Cuba, see LIBERTAD
Act, 22 U.S.C. § 6065.
164. H.R. REP. No. 104-468, at 45-6 (1996) (Conf. Rep. to accompany H.R. 927).
165. See Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 515.
166. U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936); see also U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/NSIAD-99-10, CUBAN EMBARGO: SELECTED ISSUES
RELATING TO TRAVEL, EXPORTS, AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS 18 (1998).
167. Id., referencing 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b).
2010]
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:1
Branch about its interpretation of the LIBERTAD codification
provision. In a 1998 letter to the General Accounting Office
(GAO), State and Treasury Department officials outlined the view
that the LIBERTAD language "does [not] rule out reasonable
adjustments to the licensing regime consistent with the limita-
tions on suspension or termination [of the embargo as outlined in
LIBERTADI ... ." In that same 1998 report, the GAO accepted the
Executive Branch's interpretation, concluding that: "[tihe execu-
tive branch has broad authority under U.S. law to make changes
in the embargo as circumstances dictate."'68  Because the
LIBERTAD Act also contained a provision on remittances from
U.S. nationals to family in Cuba,169 the Clinton Administration
had a legally arguable case in revising the policy in that specific
area. The latitude that is presumed to exist in the President's abil-
ity to revise remittance policy has been determined to exist in
regards to other elements of the embargo, such as revising rules
on travel. 70
The George W. Bush Administration also modified the CACR
during its tenure. In 2004, the administration tightened restric-
tions in a number of areas, including policies on travel, remit-
tances, and gift parcels to Cuba.17 These actions, however, were
consistent with congressional intent on the LIBERTAD Act's codi-
fication of the embargo, which clearly viewed with approval the
possibility of tightening sanctions.
In 2008, the Bush administration loosened restrictions on
selected information technologies, especially involving telecommu-
nications. Again, this action was consistent with statutory man-
dates. Telecommunications have had a long carve-out in embargo
policies. The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 specifically authorized
telecommunications: "[t]elecommunications services between the
United States and Cuba shall be permitted."72 The CDA further
168. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/NSIAD-99-10, CUBAN EMBARGO:
SELECTED ISSUES RELATING TO TRAVEL, EXPORTS, AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS 19
(1998).
169. LIBERTAD Act, 22 U.S.C. § 6042(1)(A).
170. The General Accounting Office reaffirmed its conclusion on the President's
ability to modify the embargo in certain areas - travel, remittances, gift parcels, and
trade - in a September 2009 report to Members of Congress. See U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-09-951R, U.S. EMBARGO ON CUBA: RECENT REGULATORY
CHANGES AND POTENTIAL PRESIDENTIAL OR CONGRESSIONAL ACTIONS 1-17 (2009).
171. Gift parcels are a form of "care packages" from U.S. nationals to family in
Cuba. Report to the President, COMMISSION FOR ASSISTANCE TO A FREE CUBA, 29-32
(July 2006) http://www.cafc.gov/.
172. CDA, 22 U.S.C. § 6004(e)(1).
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authorized facilities "in such quantity and of such quality as may
be necessary to provide efficient and adequate telecommunica-
tions services" between the two countries and authorized the
licensing of payments to Cuba as a result of these services.173
The LIBERTAD Act modified this CDA telecommunications
language by creating a clear statutory prohibition on U.S. invest-
ment - as opposed to payments to Cuba for the provision of ser-
vices - in Cuba's domestic telecommunications sector.174 The
LIBERTAD legislation's accompanying Conference Report out-
lined that the CDA provision on telecommunications "should not
be construed as authorizing any United States person to make any
direct or indirect investment, in case or in-kind, in the domestic
telephone network within the island of Cuba" until the President
has determined that a transition government is in place in
Cuba. 7' At the time of such a presidential determination, prohib-
ited transactions under the Cuban Asset Control Regulations
(amongst other, select provisions of law) can be allowed. Both the
George W. Bush and Obama Administrations based their deci-
sions to increase the flow of communications to the Cuban people
through telecommunication linkages, including mobile and cellu-
lar phone service, on the CDA and LIBERTAD provisions of law.
In April 2009, the Obama Administration adjusted the policy
for travel and remittances for those with family in Cuba and
expanded telecommunications interaction with Cuba.7 6 It is esti-
mated that family travelers to Cuba reached 200,000 in 2009, with
that number having increased further during 2010, to a reported
1,000 people a day traveling to the island. 77 Historically, the
exact numbers of U.S. nationals traveling both legally and ille-
gally to Cuba remains open to debate. It is estimated that
upwards of 170,000 Americans were traveling annually to Cuba
by about 2004, of which about 125-130,000 had family in Cuba. 78
173. CDA, 22 U.S.C. § 6004(e)(2)-(3).
174. LIBERTAD Act.
175. H.R. REP. No. 104-468, at 45 (1996) (Conf. Rep. to accompany H.R. 927).
176. Fact Sheet: Reaching Out to the Cuban People, THE WHITE HOUSE: OFFICE OF
THE PRESS SECRETARY (Apr. 13, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/
Fact-Sheet-Reaching-out-to-the-Cuban-people/.
177. Cuba Reports More Tourism, Less Revenue, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 25, 2009,
http://www.miamiherald.com/2009/12/25/1398067/cuba-reports-more-tourism-less.
html; South Florida Sees Upswing in Family Trips to Cuba, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 8,
2009, http://www.miamiherald.com/2009/09/08/1224032/south-florida-sees-upswing-
in.html; Marc Frank, Big Jump Seen in US Travel to Cuba in 2010, REUTERS (Dec. 6,
2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6B54E520101206.
178. Report to the President, COMMISSION FOR ASSISTANCE TO A FREE CUBA, 14-33
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As of October 1, 2010, in addition to those who claim to have
"close family" in Cuba, others who can legally travel to Cuba
include journalists and support personnel; full-time professionals
to conduct research or to attend professional meetings and confer-
ences; those involved in the production or distribution of agricul-
tural products, medicines and medical devices; and U.S.
telecommunications service providers.
17 1
It is also possible to travel to Cuba to pursue educational
activities, including course work and academic research; to engage
in free-lance journalism, public performances, and activities
related to private foundations, research, or educational institu-
tions; or to pursue activities related to the export or import of
informational materials. 8 '
Remittances"' from U.S. nationals to Cuba are another area
of interaction between the United States and Cuba. The Executive
Branch has modified the policy on the sending of remittances over
the years. In 1977, as part of his effort to change the bilateral rela-
tionship, the Carter Administration let lapse restrictions on travel
to Cuba which also had the effect of permitting remittances. The
focus on remittances increased during the Clinton Administration,
with that administration tightening the rules in the wake of its
policy changes for Cuban migrants, then loosening remittances in
the context of Pope John Paul's visit to Cuba in January 1999.2
President George W. Bush returned to a more restrictive remit-
(July 2006) http://www.cafc.gov/. For various perspectives on Cuba and tourism, see
MARK FALCOFF, CUBA: THE MORNING AFTER: CONFRONTING CASTRO'S LEGACY (2003);
CORBETT, supra note 77; JULIA SWEIG, CUBA: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW (2009);
Jaime Suchlicki, Implications of Ending the Cuba Travel Ban, Focus ON CUBA, CUBA
TRANSITION PROJECT: INST. FOR CUBAN AND CUBAN-AM. STUDIES, UNIV. OF MIAMI (July
20, 2010); James Cason, The Case Against Unlimited Travel to Cuba as an Agent of
Democratization, ASSOCIATION FOR THE STUDY OF THE CUBAN ECONOMY: CUBA IN
TRANSITION, 23-28 (July 30-Aug. 1, 2009), http://lanic.utexas.edulproject/asce/pdfs/
volumei9/pdfs/cason.pdf; Gary H. Maybarduk, Comments on "The Case Against
Unlimited Travel to Cuba as an Agent of Democratization" by James Cason,
ASSOCIATION FOR THE STUDY OF THE CUBAN ECONOMY: CUBA IN TRANSITION, 29-30
(July 30-Aug. 1, 2009), http://lanic.utexas.edu/project/asce/pdfs/volumel9/pdfs/
maybardukcomment.pdf; MARK P. SULLIVAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31139,
CUBA: U.S. RESTRICTIONS ON TRAVEL AND REMITTANCES (Apr. 16, 2010).
179. Cuba: What You Need to Know About U.S. Sanctions Against Cuba: An
Overview of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations - Title 31 Part 515 of the U.S. Code
of Federal Regulations, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY: OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSET
CONTROL (updated Sept. 3, 2009), http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/
programslcubalcuba.pdf.
180. Id.
181. "A remittance is a payment of money sent to a person in another place." U.S.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 166, at n.2.
182. See SHuLTz, supra note 143, at 491.
MANAGED ENGAGEMENT
tance policy, keeping the Clinton era amount of $1,200 annually,
but limiting remittances to immediate family in Cuba. 83 President
Obama lifted those restrictions in April 2009. Through a policy
directive, the Obama Administration removed the limits on
amounts and frequency of remittances, and also expanded the
members of a family in Cuba who are eligible to receive funds.8 4
As with specific figures on those traveling to Cuba, exact
amounts of remittances flowing from the United States to Cubans
remain subject to debate. Researchers place total remittances
from as low as the $300-$500 million range to $830 to $985 million
annually, depending on the methodological calculations applied."'8
U.S. residents account for about half of all remittances to Cuba. It
is estimated that forty to fifty percent of U.S. residents with fam-
ily in Cuba send money to those relatives. In all, upwards of two
million Cubans are receiving remittances from family outside
Cuba. Recent economic conditions have impacted these figures,
but remittances are a reality and continue. I8 6
Even with the changes in travel and remittance policies, the
most significant interaction between citizens of the United States
and the Cuban government - not the Cuban people - involves the
sale of food and agricultural products. The Trade Sanctions
Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (TSRA) authorizes
183. Report to the President, COMMISSION FOR ASSISTANCE TO A FREE CUBA, 14-33
(July 2006), http://www.cafc.gov/.
184. Fact Sheet: Reaching Out to the Cuban People, THE WHITE HOUSE: OFFICE OF
THE PRESS SECRETARY (Apr. 13, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/
Fact-Sheet-Reaching-out-to-the-Cuban-people/.
185. See Jorge Perez-Lopez & Sergio Diaz-Briquets, Remittances to Cuba: A Survey
of Methods and Estimates, ASSOCIATION FOR THE STUDY OF THE CUBAN ECONOMY:
CUBA IN TRANSITION 396-409 (Aug 4-6, 2005), http://lanic.utexas.edu/project/asce/
pdfs/volumel5/pdfs/diazbriquetsperezlopez.pdf; see also Report to the President,
COMMISSION FOR ASSISTANCE TO A FREE CUBA 14-33 (July 2006), http://www.cafc.gov/;
Manuel Orozco, The Cuban Condition: Migration, Remittances, and Its Diaspora,
INTER-AMERICAN DIALOGUE (2009), http://www.thedialogue.orgfPublicationFiles/
cuban%20condition%20migration%20remittances FINAL.pdf.; Manuel Orozco, On
Remittances, Markets and the Law: The Cuban Experience in President Times,
ASSOCIATION FOR THE STUDY OF THE CUBAN ECONOMY: CUBA IN TRANSITION 406-11
(July 30-Aug. 1, 2009), http://lanic.utexas.edulproject/asce/pdfs/volumel9/pdfs/orozco.
pdf; Remittances to Cuba from the United States, BENDXEN & ASSOCIATES (May 25,
2005), http://www.bendixenandassociates.com/studies/LAD%200rozco%20Cuban%20
Remittances%20Presentation%202005.pdf.
186. On January 14, 2011, the Obama Administration announced its intention to
further revise the CACR on "1.) purposeful travel; 2.) non-family remittances; and 3.)
U.S. airports supporting licensed charter flights to and from Cuba." Reaching Out to
the Cuban People, THE WHITE HOUSE: OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY (Jan. 14,
2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/14/reaching-out-cuban-
people.
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cash-in-advance sales or sales financed through third country
mechanisms.187 Rather than being the result of Executive Branch
action, this legislation liberalizing the bilateral relationship was
the product of a farm-state congressional reaction to Congress'
own efforts to increase sanctions regimes generally. This also
reflected the specific interest of the farm lobby in expanding com-
mercial markets for U.S. food and agricultural products and was
based on the argument that "American farmers and ranchers face
a disproportionate burden from U.S. economic sanctions."8 '
While travel and remittances are based on people-to-people
relationships, there is no trade with the Cuban people in the case
of food and agricultural sales. The Cuban state maintains a
monopoly on these interactions. The only Cuban entity authorized
to import products, including food, is a state agency, Empresas
Comercializadora de Alimentos (ALIMPORT/Cuban Food Import
Agency).
Implementation of TSRA became an element in the struggle
between the President and the Congress over Cuba policy begin-
ning in late 2004. The U.S. Treasury Department received "inquir-
ies from U.S. financial institutions on the question of whether or
not the shipment of goods prior to receipt of payment by U.S.
exporters was permitted" under TSRA's cash-in-advance provi-
sion. Because TSRA contained no definition of "cash-in-advance,"
either in the statute or the accompanying legislative history, the
Treasury held extensive consultations on the question. Basically,
it came down to a question of payment before shipment or before
delivery of the goods to Cuba. The Treasury determined that "the
commonly understood meaning of the term [cash-in-advancel in
the international trade finance community is that full payment for
the goods is received by the exporter before the goods are
shipped."18 9
Those opposed to the U.S. embargo criticized this interpreta-
tion, expressing concerns that it would hinder sales to Cuba. 90
187. Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000, 22 U.S.C. § 79
U.S. H.R.: OFFICE OF THE LAW REVISION COUNSEL (Feb. 1, 2010), http://uscode.
house.gov/download/pls/22C79.txt.
188. For example, see S. CONG. REC. The Sanctions Policy Reform Act S. 757, at
5981-82 (Mar. 25, 1999) (statement of Sen. Richard Lugar). The effort to approve the
Sanctions Policy Reform Act was a precursor to TSRA.
189. Report to the President, COMMISSION FOR ASSISTANCE TO A FREE CUBA 14-33
(July 2006), http://www.cafc.gov/.
190. See Larry Luxner, New OFAC Rulings Worry Food Exporters as U.S. Sales to
Alimport Pass $1 Billion, CUBA NEWS, Dec. 2004, at 1-2.
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Despite the near hysteria of embargo opponents, agricultural
trade flourished, with the high point in single year sales - $710
million in 2008 - being reached when the full-payment-for-goods-
before-shipment was in effect."' In 2009, again at the initiative of
anti-embargo groups and elements of the farm and business lobby,
Congress overturned the Treasury Department's definition of
cash-in-advance, allowing payment before the transfer of title to
or control over the goods. 92
In the ten years since the enactment of TSRA, the total value
of authorized food and agricultural product exports to Cuba
stands at more than $3.3 billion dollars. Sales dropped in 2009, to
$528 million, a decrease due to the economic constraints in Cuba
which was also hit by the global economic downturn. As of mid-
2010, sales stood at $182 million, representing a thirty-five per-
cent decrease from the same period in 2009. However, as the
U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council noted, this decrease was
primarily a consequence not of U.S. policy but of Cuban govern-
ment decisions "which lessen its ability to earn foreign exchange"
with which to buy products. Still, as of mid-2010, Cuba ranked
fortieth of a total of 225 global export markets for U.S. agricul-
tural products."'
V. CONCLUSION
Cuba has long been a focus of attention by U.S. policy-makers
and segments of the American public, and not always for geo-stra-
tegic or altruistic reasons. As early as the Administration of
Thomas Jefferson, Cuba received attention for the place the island
was perceived to have in Napoleon's imperial aspirations.19' Since
that time, the U.S.-Cuba relationship has often been burdened by
mythology, misperceptions and misunderstandings on both sides
of the Florida Straits.
Since the advent of Fidel Castro's emergence in power, the
central tool of U.S. Cuba policy has been economic pressure (the
"embargo"). This overt policy was augmented in the early years
191. 2010-2001 U.S. Export Statistics for Cuba, U.S.-CUBA TRADE AND ECONOMIC
COUNCIL: ECONOMIC EYE ON CUBA (July 2010), http://www.cubatrade.org/.
192. See MARK P. SULLIVAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 40193, CUBA: ISSUES FOR THE
111TH CONGRESS 28-29 (July 16, 2010), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/
R40193_20100716.pdf.
193. 2010-2001 U.S. Export Statistics for Cuba, supra note 191.
194. MERRILL D. PETERSON, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE NEW NATION: A
BIOGRAPHY (1970). For a critical overview of U.S.-Cuban relations through the mid-
twentieth century, see SHULTZ, supra note 143, at 13-33.
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with covert operations seeking the wholesale replacement of the
revolutionary government through armed means or the targeted
removal of that government's central personality, Fidel Castro.195
In the post-Cold War world, a form of "managed engagement"
with either the Cuban government or the Cuban people, or both
has complemented the use of economic pressure. Support for the
emergence of a democratic Cuba - where the Cuban people deter-
mine the nature and role of their government rather than the gov-
ernment determining the role of Cuba's citizenry - has remained
the central objective of U.S. policy.
U.S. policies, including the embargo, have also sought to
reflect a political and moral statement that we reject dictatorship
and its abuses, and that we have not forgotten those courageous
Cubans who are seeking and working towards their dream of a
free Cuban society. However, the public discussion of U.S. policy
towards Cuba - and whether or how to adjust that policy, namely
the "embargo" - often leaves an impression that there is and has
been a static relationship with a lack of interaction between those
in the United States and the people of Cuba. In reality, there con-
sistently have been avenues for interaction. These avenues have
been narrowed as well as widened over the years, as noted in this
article, but they have existed.
The fact that U.S. presidents have been reluctant to com-
pletely step away from the embargo, even after initially expres-
sing a willingness to do so or pursuing modifications in its
application is a testament to its utility and flexibility, albeit
within limits. This is the misunderstood aspect of U.S. policy.
From a policymaker's perspective, the "embargo" offers a degree of
flexibility that may seem counter-intuitive given the policy's char-
acterization in the larger public debate. Within the context of the
embargo, the United States has sought occasional openings in its
relations with the Cuban government over the past thirty years
and to establish avenues of communication with the Cuban
people.
One can expect this to remain the case as Cuba evolves and
continues its own effort at "managed engagement" with the world.
On a superficial level, Cuba appears to be open to business and
expanded interaction with the world. This is fed by its efforts to
attract and harness foreign investment, especially in segments of
the economy that will benefit the current Cuban government's
195. See DON BOHNING, THE CASTRO OBSESSION: U.S. COVERT OPERATIONS AGAINST
CUBA, 1959-1965 (2005).
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survival strategy. The average Cuban citizen, however, remains
legally constrained in benefitting from that interaction, as well as
constrained from having a significant say in the policies that
affect their daily lives. The Cuban government's announcement of
expanded areas for self-employment does not change this funda-
mental situation.
While the spread of technology is increasing the capacity of
Cubans to form new social relationships and engage in innovation
and expression outside of the parameters set forth by the Cuban
government, that same government is working diligently to sup-
press broad citizen access. Technologies initiatives as imple-
mented by Presidents George W. Bush and Obama, respectively,
should remain an element of U.S. policy as allowed by existing
legal parameters; however, they are not some magic instrument
that alone will change the course of Cuba's history or the U.S.
relationship with that nation.
The continuing challenge for the United States is a recogni-
tion that changes in that country will come from within the Cuban
family. In the course of seeking an effective means to support this,
we should keep in mind two realities. The first goes to the nature
of closed societies, such as that existing in today's Cuba, which
was summed up in an observation by former Czech dissident and
later democratically elected president Vaclav Havel:
Do not forget, in a totalitarian system we can observe an
interesting phenomenon. People in power, like their citi-
zens, speak out only when the time is ripe. Our leaders all
wear a uniform mask and declare identical phrases. Per-
haps at the moment of history, the masks will fall, and it is
only at that moment that we know who is who. It is possi-
ble then that we may be surprised to find that the masks
concealed an intelligent face.196
The second reality is life as it is lived by average Cubans on a
day-by-day basis and how U.S. policy decisions may affect them.
This was summed up in early 2009 in a letter from seventeen
independent Cuban civil society activists to President Obama.
Speaking in the name of "Cubans who have defied the repression
[and] the intimidation" of the Cuban government, they wrote:
We ask that you do not put commercial considerations
ahead of political freedom for our people. We invite you not
to sacrifice the moral leadership of the United States in the
196. MICHAEL MEYER, THE YEAR THAT CHANGED THE WORLD: THE UNTOLD STORY
BEHIND THE FALL OF THE BERLIN WALL 141 (2009).
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face of commercial temptations. Your presidency is a trib-
ute to everything that can be conquered when a cause is
just and correct. We dedicate our lives to the movement for
the freedom of Cuba and expect - one day - to have a demo-
cratically-elected Cuban president who would welcome you
to Havana. Do not forget us. We need your support. We, too,
'have a dream' of freedom.
197
How these two realities are balanced in the course of U.S. policy
implementation will decide whether U.S. interaction with Cuba
enriches and reinforces the current, repressive governmental
structure or provides a means to empower and enable the fulfill-
ment of Cubans' aspirations and priorities.
197. S. CONG. REC. Letter to President Obama from Cuban Patriots, at S4302 (Apr.
2, 2009).
